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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TIMOTHY LAMOREAUX, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 2090471 -CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case involving first degree felony convictions 
entered in a court of record and transferred from the Utah Supreme Court, by virtue of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. May an officer testify using an out of court statement when that officer has 
testified that the out of court statement does not assist his memory of the events to 
which he is testifying? 
Whether evidence constitutes hearsay is a question of law that we review for 
correctness. Benitez v. Department of Health, 20080957-CA (UT App 2009). 
A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion, unless it involves a legal question, which is reviewed for 
correctness. McKelvey v. Hamilton, 2009 UT App 126. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are relevant: 
1. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
2. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(c). 
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
3. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 612. Writing used to refresh memory. 
If a witness uses a writing to refresh the witness' memory for the purpose of 
testifying, either (1) while testifying, or (2) before testifying, if the court in its 
discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice, an adverse party is 
entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine 
the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to 
the testimony of the witness. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Timothy Lamoreaux appeals from a jury trial conviction of distribution or 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone in violation of § 58-37-
8(l)(A)(ii). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court 
On January 6, 2009, Appellant was convicted of Distribution or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance in a drug free zone. After completion of trial, appellant 
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was sentenced on April 29, 2009. Subsequent to being sentenced, appellant filed a notice 
of appeal on May 26, 2009. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
At the jury trial, in January 2009, the State of Utah called three witnesses, Officer 
Shane Sorensen, the investigating officer, Michael Hepworth, a chemist from the Utah 
Crimes Lab, and Suzanne Ruesch, a co-defendant. The defense did not call any 
witnesses. 
Officer Sorensen testified that he responded to a phone call about illegal parking. 
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 5, 2009, at pg. 63. During the course of 
his testimony, Officer Sorensen had a police report in front of him and repeatedly refered 
to the report for information about the events of the evening in question. Id, at 65, 67, 80, 
81, 82, and 83 [this list of the officer's references to his report is not intended to be 
inclusive of all such references but is included to show the Court the extent to which the 
officer relied on his notes to testify]. As the officer walked around the area where the 
report originated he observed the defendant and another male talking to three individuals, 
two adult females and one child, in a vehicle. Id, at 64-65. As he approached the officer 
saw the defendant hand something to the driver of the vehicle, Suzanne Ruesche. Id, at 
67. The officer testified that he arrested the defendant and then interviewed the 
occupants of the vehicle including Ms. Ruesche, searched her vehicle and found 
methamphetamine. Id, at 67-71. 
The officer then stated that he interviewed the defendant about his involvement, 
both on the scene and later at the jail. Id, at 77-78. The officer testified that the 
defendant repeatedly denied any involvement with the methamphetamine. Id, at 78-79. 
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The officer testified that at the jail, after the defendant again denied involvement, 
that "he did make some incriminating statements." Id, at 79-80. When asked to describe 
what the defendant said, the officer testified, after referring to his report to refresh his 
memory that defendant did "admit that he was involved in making the arrangements to 
distribute methamphetamine." Id, at 81. However, the State continued to try to get the 
officer to recall what "incriminating statements" the defendant made, Id, at 81-83, during 
which the officer repeatedly asked to refer to his report. The State finally asked, "What 
about what he said indicated to you that he had been involved with this drug deal?" Id, at 
82. The officer again requested to "refer to his report," and asked the Court, "Can I refer 
to my report and read that specifically?" Id, at 83. At this time defense counsel objected, 
stating that due to the repeated failure to have his memory refreshed by the report, that 
any answer would be hearsay. Id. The Court responded by stating, "The next question is 
whether or not reading the report. . . does, in fact, refresh his memory." Id. The State 
then specifically asked, "Does that report refresh your memory about what Mr. 
Lamoreaux said to you that night?" to which the officer stated, "To be honest, no, it 
doesn't." Id. 
Following presentation of evidence, defense counsel moved for those parts of 
Officer Sorensen's testimony regarding the "incriminating statements" be struck, or that 
an instruction be given the jury to ignore those portions of the officer's testimony as they 
were hearsay. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 6, 2009, at pg. 7-9. The 
court denied the motion, stating, "I think it just goes to the weight. And that's how I will 
rule." Id, at 9. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should find error where the trial court failed to give an instruction to 
the jury stating that Officer Sorensen's testimony that the defendant had confessed should 
not have been considered. This Court should find that Officer Sorensen's testimony as it 
relates to the defendant's confession was inadmissible hearsay as it was apparent from 
the witness's own statement, that he was transmitting to the jury the contents of his report 
and not the contents of his memory. Bridges v. Candland, 54 P.2d 842, 847 (Utah 1936), 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING SOME CORRECTIVE 
ACTION WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT OFFICER SORENSEN WAS 
INTRODUCING HEARSAY ONTO THE RECORD THROUGH THE GUISE 
OF REFRESHING HIS MEMORY. 
A, Relevant Law 
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trail or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Utah R. 
ofEvid. 801(c). While Utah practice and Rule 612 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allow 
for a witness to use almost anything to "refresh the witness' memory for the purpose of 
testifying," Utah R. ofEvid, 612, "care must be exercised by the [trial] court to see that 
such instrument is serving the function merely of starting the recollective processes in 
action." Bridges, 54 P.2d, at 846. 
In Bridges v. Candland, there was a dispute over a contract. Id, at 842-846. 
During the trial a witness testified as to his understanding of the events surrounding 
certain ambiguities in a contract, which witness was then cross-examined in a manner 
that cast doubt onto his testimony during direct. Id, at 845-846. On redirect the witness 
was provided with an affidavit from an opposition witness, which affidavit had been 
- 5 -
refused admission by the court, and "was apparently permitted to sit before the jury and 
'refresh his recollection' by reading largely from the document, against the objection of 
plaintiff." Id, at 846. 
In analyzing "refreshing a recollection," the Supreme Court of Utah stated, 
"refreshing a recollection is not equivalent to reading from a document," and "care must 
be exercised by the court to see that such instrument is serving the function merely of 
starting the recollective processes in action." Id. The Court then held, "[the] objection 
was well taken. Any statements of [the affidavit] of the nature offered . . . were hearsay." 
Id, at 847. 
This counsel has not been able to find any direction from either the Court of 
Appeals of Utah, or the Utah Supreme Court, as to how district court judges are supposed 
to carry out the mandate given in Bridges that "care must be exercised by the court to see 
that such instruments [are] serving the function . . . of. . . starting the recollective 
processes." Id, at 846. However, in Corpus Juris Secundum [CJS], a survey of 
jurisdictions in the United States provides the following rules and guidance as to 
implementing the "Refreshing Memory" principle. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 438 (June 
2009). The CJS supports the Utah Supreme Court's statements in Bridges saying, "the 
court must determine whether the witness is testifying from the writing or from 
recollection, and whether refreshing recollection is a mere subterfuge to improperly 
suggest to the witness the testimony that is expected." Id. The CJS goes on to state that a 
foundation must be laid before a memory may be refreshed in that memory should not be 
refreshed until "it appears that the aid of this writing is necessary." Once a memory has 
been refreshed, "a witness may testify as to matters about which memory has been 
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refreshed if the testimony is from a present and independent recollection," and "the 
witness must testify to the facts as remembered from the refreshed recollection, without 
the aid of the writing, and may not read or show the writing to the jury or state what the 
writing says or shows." Id. 
B. Application of Law to Facts 
In the present case, Officer Sorensen testified with a copy of the police report in 
his hands throughout the entirety of his testimony. Officer Sorensen referred to his report 
throughout, and made a record that his testimony was coming from his report on at least 
six [6] times. At a critical point in his testimony the officer was unable to recall what, if 
any, "incriminating statements" were made by the defendant without referring to his 
report. Then when asked pointedly, "Does that report refresh your memory about what 
Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that night?" the officer stated, "To be honest, no, it doesn't." 
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 5, 2009, at pg. 83. 
Throughout the officer's testimony the court exercised no care to see that the 
report was being used for the limited function of starting the recollective process. When 
objection was raised to the repeated use of the report, the court agreed that the witness 
needed to respond to the foundational question of "whether or not reading the report 
does, in fact, refresh his memory." Id. However, even though the officer testified that 
"To be honest, no, it doesn't," Id, the court took no efforts to rectify the situation, when 
asked to do so by defense counsel, as the court held, "I think it just goes to the weight. 
And that's how I will rule." Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, January 6, 2009, at 
Pg.9. 
Officer Sorensen repeatedly referred to his report without any foundation that he 
needed his memory refreshed. Officer Sorensen read facts from the report without ever 
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testifying that the report had refreshed his memory as to those facts. The court allowed 
the officer to testify from the report without exercising any care that the testimony was 
from an independent recollection of the facts to which the officer was testifying. And 
then, following an objection by defense counsel, when the officer testified honestly and 
clearly that the report had not refreshed his memory as to anything said to the officer by 
the defendant on the night in question, the court refused to correct the error as requested 
by defense counsel. 
C. This Court Should Correct the Error 
Because the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony through the guise of 
refreshing the witnesses memory, this Court should reverse the defendant's conviction 
and order that a new trial be held in this matter. 
Furthermore, because neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of Utah has 
provided any procedural guidance to assist the trial courts with the mandate that "care 
must be exercised by the court to see that such instruments [are] serving the function . . . 
of starting the recollective processes," Bridges, at 846, this Court should find that the 
procedural protections set forth in the CJS should become the standard in Utah courts. 
This Court should provide guidance in that before any witness may refer to a hearsay 
document for the purpose of refreshing her memory, that witness must testify as to what 
their current recollection is, and it must appear that the use of the document is necessary. 
Additionally, before the witness is then allowed to testify as to their refreshed memory, 
that witness must be able to testify under oath that their memory has been refreshed and 
that they are testifying from a present independent recollection of the event. This Court 
should also find that any testimony that appears to be the use of memory refreshing that 
does not conform to this standard is inadmissible. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should find that the trial court erred in denying a curative instruction 
when Officer Sorensen testified from his report that the defendant confessed to 
involvement in arranging to distribute methamphetamine when, in fact, Officer Sorensen 
later testified that he had no independent recollection of such a confession. The Court 
should therefore reverse appellant's conviction and remand the case for another trial. The 
Court should also provide procedural guidance as to how witnesses' memories are 
properly refreshed by otherwise inadmissible documents. 
Respectfully submitted this jy day of J LSA^L^ , 2009 
MCKAY G KING 
Counsel for Appellant, Timothy Lamoreaux 
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District; Dilworlh Woolley, Judge, 
Action by S. W. Bridges & Company against W. D. 
Candland and others, doing business as W. D. Cand-
land & Sons. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff 
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Judgment set aside and new trial granted. 
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Cited Cases 
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wool belonging to defendants, who were to pay ex-
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was to scour and sell wool within 60 days and reim-
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from defendants held error, in absence of evidence 
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for appellant. 
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Christensen, of Mt. Pleasant, for respondents. 
WOLFE, Justice. 
This appeal involves, among other matters, the con-
struction of a printed form contract and two adden-
dum telegrams; also, the extent to which oral evi-
dence should be admitted to explain an alleged ambi-
guity in those writings. Perhaps the best presentation 
of the facts may be made by setting out in full the 
printed form introduced as Exhibit E and hereafter so 
referred to, and the two telegrams set out hereunder, 
respectively, as Exhibits F and G and hereafter re-
ferred to by those designations, all being dated May 
*843 24, 1929. The italics throughout are supplied: 
"Mt. Pleasant, Utah, May 24, 1929 
For and in consideration of the payment of the sum of 
Two Thousand Dollars and Twenty-Five Hundred & 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. © 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
54P.2d842 
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No-100 Dollars as an advance on my-our wool by S. 
W. Bridges & Co., Inc., of Boston, Mass., the receipt 
of which is hereby acknowledged, 1-We agree to ship 
on consignment to the said S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc., 
my-our entire clip of 1929 wool, about 4,800 fleeces, 
about 40,000 pounds. I-we agree to deliver my-our 
wool to said S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc., (or their rep-
resentative) F. O. B. cars at D. & R. G. W. Railroad 
on or about May 29, 1929, in good, marketable con-
dition, well tied and honestly packed. A further ad-
vance: up to a total of twenty cents per pound will be 
made by S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc., or their represen-
tative. I-we agree thai if at any lime the collateral for 
said advance, in the opinion ofS. W. Bridges & Co., 
Inc., is not sufficient to adequately protect said ad-
vance together with charges, /-ice will reduce said 
advance by payment of such amount as is deemed 
necessary by S. W. Bridges & Co.. Inc., or will de-
liver sufficient additional collateral satisfactory to S. 
W. Bridges & Co., Inc. 
See telegrams of this date. 
I-we agree to pay interest on all advances, including 
freight charges and cartage, at the rate of 6 percent 
per annum, and a commission of two and one-half 
cents per pound if wool is sold in original packages, 
or three cents per pound if wool is graded, said com-
mission to include guarantee of sales, also labor, 
storage, and premium for fire insurance for 6 months 
after arrival of wool in Boston. S. W. Bridges & Co,, 
Inc., agree to keep the wool insured against fire in 
companies of good reputation. It is mutually agreed 
that the selling of the said wool is to be left to the 
best judgment of S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc. 
I-we agree to defend the title of said wool against all 
claims whatsoever. 
It is understood and agreed that this contract cannot 
be altered in any respect, nor shall any lien or mort-
gage be placed on the wool during the life of this 
contract except by written consent of S. W. Bridges 
& Co., Inc. 
This agreement is signed in duplicate, one copy to be 
retained by each party. 
[Signed] W. D. Candland & Sons." 
On this contract is a notation, "See telegrams of this 
date." The telegrams read as follows: 
"S. W. Bridges and Co., Inc. 
200 Summer Street, Boston, Mass. 
Upon receipt by North Sanpete Bank here or tele-
gram that yoii will not demand additional margin 
from W. D. Candland and Sons nor John H. Seely & 
Sons Co. against their wool consignments unless 
their equity therein declines below twenty percent 
Candland and Seely will deposit drafts for forty five 
hundred and six thousand dollars respectively with 
consignment contracts attached balance of twenty 
cents per pound advance will be drawn against bills 
lading covering forty thousand and sixty thousand lbs 
respectively prompt shipment early sale requested no 
restrictions very reasonably hope to net thirty two flat 
job my address Saff Lake City. 
[Signed] Alex R. Livingstone, Jr." 
The above was Exhibit F. Exhibit G reads as follows: 
"North Sanpete Bank, 
Mt. Pleasant, Utah. 
As arranged by Alexander Livingstone we will accept 
consignments Candland and Seely advancing a total 
of twenty cents per pound terms as per our printed 
contract. We will not call for any additional margin 
from Candland or Seely unless their equity in the 
total amount expended shall fall below twenty per-
cent of the fair value of the wool please wire if trans-
action is definitely closed. 
[Signed] S. W. Bridges & Co., Inc," 
According to the testimony of Mr. Bridges, Alex R. 
Livingstone, Jr., was a wool buyer for the plaintiff 
and other firms. 
The complaint alleged that $8,700 had been advanced 
to defendants on the wool; that total credits allowable 
to defendants by reason of the sale of the wool 
amounted to $9,709.74; and that the total charges 
against them for advances, interest on advances, 
scouring charges, inspection and separation, commis-
sions, and miscellaneous expenses amounted to 
$12,333.10, leaving due the plaintiff $2,624.30, 
which defendants refused to pay. While defendants in 
their answer technically denied the correctness of 
these amounts, the matter was not disputed by evi-
dence. The plaintiff set out as a basis for its recovery 
only the writing Exhibit E without the supplemental 
telegrams. The defendants *844 denied that such was 
the contract, but set up an amended counterclaim 
alleging that the agreement was that plaintiff would 
grade and scour the wool and sell the same at the fair 
market value within 60 days after deliver}' of the 
vvool to it. 
The evidence for plaintiff was entirely by depositions 
and documentary. W. D. Candland was the only wit-
ness who testified orally for the defendants. He testi-
fied that he did not want to sign Exhibit E with the 
italicized portions in the contract, whereupon Living-
stone sent Exhibit F and the Sanpete Bank received in 
reply Exhibit G. Candland was permitted to give tes-
timony of purported conversations between himself 
and Livingstone before the contract was signed to the 
effect that Livingstone had agreed that Bridges would 
have the wool scoured and sold within 60 days. Noth-
ing appeared in the writings concerning such agree-
ment between the parties. The court admitted it under 
the theory that it was of aid in clearing up an ambigu-
ity. Contends Candland that if plaintiff had per-
formed this alleged agreement to sell in 60 days from 
delivery, enough would have been realized so that all 
plaintiffs advances and expenses would have been 
paid and Candland would have received $2,800. for 
which amount defendants prayed judgment in their 
counterclaim. 
Examination of the writings and of the evidence, we 
think, abundantly reveals and sustains the proposition 
that under no theory of the case was (he oral evidence 
Of Candland admissible to show an agreement with 
plaintiff to grade, scour, and sell within 60 days after 
delivery. On this ground, as well as on additional 
grounds later to be considered, the judgment must be 
reversed. 
An examination of Exhibits E, F, and G, above 
quoted, leaves it doubtful whether there really is an 
ambiguity. The testimony of Candland shows that 
defendants refused to accept the italicized condition 
in the proffered printed form. Then Livingstone sent 
Exhibit F, which is really not a part of the contract 
because it is informative to plaintiff that Candland 
would accept a contract in which plaintiff would not 
call for more collateral or "drawback" of any part of 
the advances unless their equity declined below 20 
per cent. Twenty per cent, of what? The common-
sense version is 20 per cent, of the value of the wool 
Candland was selling. Candland was the owner of the 
wool, but the plaintiffs advances gave it a very sub-
stantial interest in that wool. It would be as anxious 
as Candland to sell the wool for enough to meet all 
advancements, commissions, and charges. Tersely, as 
telegrams usually are written, it is plain that what was 
meant was that as long as the value of the wool at any 
time on the market kept at such a figure that 20 per 
cent, or more of that value after all the advancements, 
commissions, and charges owing to plaintiff were 
deducted, belonged to the defendants, plaintiff would 
demand no further collateral or drawback of the ad-
vancement. Thousands of telegrams a year are sent 
where words ctsed are invested with meaning derived 
from business and trade practices or understandings. 
No intelligent business man would have mistaken the 
meaning of Exhibit F. It is part of the contract, how-
ever, only as it serves to explain Exhibit G, which 
was the reply telegram. In Exhibit G plaintiff made a 
slip which it seems was its undoing. It states that the 
plaintiff will not call for any additional security un-
less defendants' equity "in the total amount ex-
pended' shall fall below 20 per cent, of the fair value 
of the wool. This, literally read, does not appear to 
make sense. What plaintiff most probably meant was 
that if the difference between the value of the wool 
and the amount expended did not fall below 20 per 
cent, of the former, it would not call for collateral. 
Strictly speaking, there is an ambiguity. But this did 
not furnish defendants with a license to introduce 
evidence which never could explain such ambiguity. 
The evidence in regard to an agreement to grade and 
scour and sell within 60 days had no relation to the 
ambiguity in this telegram. Defendants seek to find 
an opening in the phrase, "as arranged by Alexander 
Livingstone." This it is contended leaves it open as to 
what was arranged by Livingstone, and thus the door 
is open for the admission of all the alleged oral 
agreements. Not so. It was clear that the wire of May 
24th (Exhibit G), in answer to one sent the same day 
by Livingstone (Exhibit F), did not refer to any ar-
rangements which, if made at all, plaintiff at the time 
it received the wire had never heard of. Candland 
testified that Livingstone told him that he (Living-
stone) had told plaintiff of the 60-dny agreement and 
thus plaintiff could have referred to it. But the only 
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notation on the contract is to these telegrams, and we 
have no evidence of *845 what if an> thing mort 
than was contained in the telegram of Livingstone 
had been communicated to plaintiff It is quite evi 
dent the parties desired to make the printed form as 
modified by the telegrams the contract and not the 
printed form as modified by the telegrams as added to 
or modified or supplemented b> what either Cand-
land or Livingstone might say they talked about 
It was to guard against a situation of this sort that the 
clause was placed in the contract that it could not be 
altered except by the consent of the plaintiff This is a 
typical case which shows the value of that precaution 
Livingstone nowhere through deposition or other 
wise, is a witness But the adverse party gives evi 
deuce of what Livingstone said before the contract 
was signed and what he said a year after (see 
hereunder) under the theory evidently that everything 
Livingstone is purported to have said is as if the prin-
cipal, Bridges had said it Livingstone being the 
agent of Bridges Everything which Candland said to 
Livingstone and ever) thing Livingstone said to 
Candland is conveyed through the mouth of Cand-
land, an adverse witness This under proper condi 
tions, is permissible but evidentl) plaintiff by its 
contract sought to foreclose an) matters not covered 
by the writings and sought to avoid being at the 
mercy of the party on the other end of the contract 
The writings cannot be added to or changed by oral 
evidence They contain the full contract When am 
biguous the ambiguity may be cleared up by oral 
evidence If so ambiguous that no sense can be de 
rived from them, in certain cases the writings are 
discarded and the agreement arrived at before it was 
reduced to writing ma) be testified to provided al-
ways that the fundamental condition is present that 
there was a meeting of the minds If tins principle 
were not adhered to, writings would be of very little 
value And they would not be of much greater value 
if the courts permitted the doing away with a definite 
recordation of the matters on which the minds had 
met by allowing, under some guise, all other matters 
discussed or talked about in a preliminary way to 
come in when that was just what the writing was de 
signed to prevent It appears that an early sale was 
requested because Livingstones wire says so But it 
merely states that it was requested not demanded 
Apparently that had been mentioned But if, instead 
of casually being mentioned Candland had consid-
ered it important that Bridges sell within 60 days and 
wanted it as part of the agreement, he would have 
insisted that the printed form be modified in that re-
gard as well as in regard to the matter ol additional 
collateral The printed part of the contract specifies, 
' that the selling of said wool is to be left to the best 
judgment of Bridges &, Co' While these observa-
tions go more to the improbability of an) time limit 
foi the sale having actually been agreed upon than to 
the question of the admissibility of the evidence they 
arc quite material in considering whether the words 
as arranged b) Ale\ Livingstone,' ever could be 
used as a vehicle to transport into the case this pur 
ported oral agreement as to a time limit for selling the 
wool We think those words cannot be made to apply 
to some alleged oral arrangement b) Livingstone, but 
must be taken to refer to the arrangement suggested 
by Livingstone in his wire to Bridges Certainly, it 
would not be bevond the confines of reasonable con 
struction to hold that the words, "as arranged by Liv-
ingstone ' were confirmator) of the suggested modi 
fication contained in Livingstones wire of the same 
date in which case all else in Bridges' wire would 
have been superfluous The 20 cents per pound ad-
vancement was e\actl> what Livingstone had put in 
his wire and the part about additional margins in the 
Bridges wire, we have little doubt was also meant to 
conform to the matter in Livingstones wire This is 
borne out by the fact that Livingstone in his wire 
says * Upon receipt of North Sanpete Bank here of a 
telegram " etc Then follow the conditions Bridges 
wired the bank He would hardly have wired the bank 
if he meant to refer to some arrangements between 
Candland and Livingstone never suggested in Living-
stone's wire and in regard to which it is quite un 
likel) that he would have thought the bank would 
know about The bank was to be apprised of the ac-
quiescence of Bridges to the suggested modification 
of the part of the printed contract relating to collateral 
and adverted to in the telegram from Livingstone to 
Bridges The bank would then accept the draft and 
present to the payor the plaintiffs bank 
Defendants however contend there is evidence of 
Livingstone's statements purported to have been 
made to Candland in the office of his attorneys on 
May 8 1930 about a year after the consignment con 
tract*846 was signed Candland on his direct exami 
nation testified, over objection that (I) "Mr Living-
stone advised me not to pa> Bridges one cent that it 
was an outrage for him to ask it that he had made a 
contract with me for Bridges, and Bridges had failed 
to keep it although he had urged him many times to 
do what he promised (2) Mr Livingstone told me 
that if Bridges had kept his agreement there would 
have been no loss but there would have been a sub 
stantial amount come to me from the sale of that 
wool (3) He had notified Mr Bridges of the agree 
ment (hat I had made with him and that Bridges had 
accepted the consignment with that understanding " 
Later on redirect examination, an affidavit purported 
to have been made by Livingstone on May 8, 1930 
the same day as the above statements were testified to 
have been made which affidavit was formerly re-
fused admission was given to Candland who was 
apparentl) permitted to sit before the |ury and re-
fresh his recollection b> reading largely from the 
document, against the objection of plaintiff We shall 
first consider this method of testifying and then take 
up the broader ground of objection made to the wit-
ness' testimony above set out given on direct and the 
additional testimon) concerning Livingstone's state 
ments to him on May 8, 1930 given on redirect by 
aid of the affidavit The admission of all this testi-
mony is assailed by assignments Nos 1 and 8 
Refreshing a recollection is not equivalent to reading 
from a document "Recollection" is defined by Web-
ster's New International Dictionary as the act or prac-
tice of collecting the mind, concentration, act of rec 
ollecting or recalling to the memory, the power of 
recalling ideas to the mind that which is recollected, 
something called to the mind The process indulged 
in by Candland was not one of having his memory 
touched off by something contained in the affidavit 
and thus supplying independent!) of the document 
after such recalling but was a process of indirectly 
getting in evidence the contents of the affidavit it 
being perfectly apparent to the jury This was more 
prejudicial than introducing the affidavit because the 
jury might not be given the benefit of any qualifica-
tions or contradictions which might appear in the 
affidavit Not Candland but the affidavit was testify 
ing Documents used in connection with recollection 
are of two sorts (1) Those which serve to set the 
processes of recollection agog The fact or circum-
stances are then loosed from the storage of the mind 
independently of the document as a present recollec-
tion It serves to titillate only (2) Those which serve 
to give present evidence of a recorded past recollec-
tion or fact Certain qualifications are required of this 
second class which need not now be discussed As to 
the first class any memorandum or document 
whether made by the witness, or by another at his 
instance, or whether never seen before will suffice 
but care must be exercised by the court to see that 
such instrument is serving the function merely of 
starting (he recollective processes in action It was 
said by Sir G A Lewin in a note to Lawes v Reed 
2 Lew Cr C 152 that ' Where the ob|ect is to revive 
in the mind of the witness the recollection of the facts 
of which he once had knowledge it is difficult to 
understand why am means should be excepted to 
whereby that object may be obtained Whether in an) 
particular case the witness memor) has been re 
freshed by the document referred to or he speaks 
from what the document tells him, is a question of 
fact open to observation more or less according to 
the circumstances If in truth the memory has been 
refreshed, and he is enabled in consequence to speak 
to facts with which he was once familiar but which 
afterwards escaped him, it cannot signify, in effect in 
what manner or by what means these facts were re 
called to his recollection Common experience tells 
every man that a very slight circumstance, and one 
not in point to the existing inquiry will sometimes 
revive the history of a transaction made up of many 
circumstances *** Why then if a man may refiesh 
his memory by such means out of court should he be 
precluded from doing so when he is under examina-
tion in court"? 2 Wigmore on Evid (2d Ed ) 17, note 
to § 758 
Wigmore says in his Second Edition on Evidence, 
vol 2 § 758, p 37 
"The purpose being to allow the legitimate use of 
written aids while preventing their misuse it would 
seem that no hard-and fast rules can be laid down for 
invariable application That which is suspicious and 
reprehensible in one instance may be entirely trust-
worthy in the *847 next No unerring marks of im-
propriety can be named absolutely 
It follows, therefore, that am writing whatevei l% 
eligible foi use while, on the other hand, am »nlmg 
»hale\ei may in the cucuinitances become im 
pi oper " 
The discretion of the court must control the use but 
where a document is excluded from admission be-
cause hearsay, the contents thereof cannot be got in 
evidence under the pretext of refreshing a recollec-
tion Where it is apparent that the witness is just 
transmitting to the jury the contents of the instrument 
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nther tlnn the contents of his memory set off by the 
instrument its use should be prevented past the point 
where it serves the latter office But on a broader 
ground objection was well taken Any statements of 
Livingstone of the nature offered made on May 8 
1930, were hearsay The theory under which they 
were offered was that they were Bridges' statements 
because made by Bridges agent in the course of 
Bridges business Assuming that Livingstone was 
representing Bridges to adjust the matter, certainly 
Livingstone was not authorized to misrepresent 
Bridges If Candland's testimony is correct, a man 
who purported to be Bridges' agent said what has 
been above numbered (1) (2) and (3) and in addi 
tion the following (4) ' He was ashamed that he had 
not been allowed to carry out the contract he made 
with me and that if Mr Bridges had carried out the 
contract there would have been no loss m the sale of 
that wool (5) that he repeatedly asked Mr Bridges to 
have it scoured ind put on the market, and he offered 
to do the work himself that that might be done, and 
(6) if it had been sold anywhere in that period there 
would have been a substantial sum returned to me, 
(7) that he got that wool on the express agreement 
that he would scour and sell w ithm 60 days " 
Statements by Livingstone designated as (I) are Liv-
ingstones advice to Candland Livingstone's impreca-
tion against his supposed principal Bridges Living-
stone's conclusion as to Bridges failing to keep a con-
tract Livingstone's purported statement designated 
(2) is Livingstones idea that Bridges had not kept his 
contract and his opinion of what would have hap-
pened had Bridges done so Advice of an agent or his 
criticism of his principal are not facts Admissions 
must generally be as to facts An opinion may in-
volve the consciousness of Inbility or fault but when 
made by an agent such opinion must be within the 
scope or his authority 
Statement (4) embraces the idea that (he contract had 
not been cirned out a conclusion on the ultimate 
question to be decided by the court on the defense 
side Statement (5) miy Inve been made by Living 
stone to Bridges but if Bridges had no duty to scour 
the wool Livingstone's request to handle the wool in 
that fashion would not mike such a duty This does 
not involve an admission that Bridges Ind the obliga 
tion to do so but only that Livingstone's idea com 
municated to Bridges, was that it should be scoured 
Statement (6) is simply the expression of an opinion 
and does not even, like statement (2), involve the 
admission of not keeping a contract which is embed-
ded in statement (2) Statement (7) purports to be 
Li\ mgstone's conclusion of what the express contract 
between Candland and Bridges was Statement (3) is 
as to the fact that Bridges had been notified of this 
purported agreement to sell within 60 days In the 
analysis of these statements we have two things to 
consider The first do any of them involve matter 
which can be classified as admissions9 Secondly, if 
admissions were they w ithin the scope of the pur-
ported agents authority or scope of agency9 We can 
test the first by considering what would be the effect 
if made by Bridges himself If Bridges had said that 
Candland did not owe him a cent that it was an out-
rage that he should ask it and that he (Bridges) had 
failed to keep his contract with Candland and that if 
he (Bridges) had kept his contract there would have 
been no loss and that he got the wool on the express 
agreement that he would scour and sell it within 60 
days the element of contradiction to his position in 
court necessary to an admission would be present, 
granting the opinions or conclusions on ultimate 
questions made bv a pirty to a suit out of court may 
be given in court a point at this time not necessary to 
decide Any one who had heard Bridges so state 
could testify to such matters and if the jury believed 
such witness Bridges would have been out of court 
But were they within the scope of the agents author-
ity9 Assuming that Lningstone on May 8 1930, was 
an agent of Bridges to seek an adjustment of the mat-
ter and there is some evidence of this in Bridges' 
deposition that he asked Livingstonc*848 about a 
year later "to see Candland about it -were these 
statements purporting to have been made by Living-
stone within (he scope of his authority9 It is hardly to 
be presumed that an agent sent out to adjust a claim 
has authority to state that his principal is a scoundrel 
and that there is nothing owing to him 
While a principal is bound by the acts or statements 
of his agent done or made within his authority and 
even within his apparent authority where the princi-
pal has put him in a position or given him such 
authority as permits an authority not given to appear 
as if given yet where the act or statement itself 
shows on its face (hat it is adverse to the principal it 
presents it once notice to the other tint theie is no 
such authority An authority to say something can 
hardl\ be apparent or actual when the statement itself 
is not for the principal but deliberately and design-
edly against him The principal in selecting an agent 
is not bound b) such treachery as that For these rea-
sons Livingstone could not be said (o have apparent 
authority in a mission peaceably to adjust a diffi 
culty to make the statements which on their face 
showed just the opposite from an authority apparent 
The statements therefore, were in no sense admis-
sions of Bridges because made by Livingstone as his 
agent within the scope of his authority or apparent 
authority Says Wigmore, vol 2, on Evidence (2d 
Cd)§l078 p 585 
"He who sets another person to do an act in his stead 
as agent is chargeable by such acts as are done under 
that authority, and so too properl) enough is af 
fected by admissions made by the agent in the course 
of exercising (hat authority The question therefore 
turns upon the scope of the authority This question 
frequently enough a difficult one, depends upon the 
doctrine of Agency applied to the circumstances of 
Die case, and not upon any rule of Evidence 
The common phrasing of the principle i! 
sented in the following passage 
well repre 
1839, Buchanan C J , in Franklin Bank v Pcnnsxl 
\ania D &. M S N Co . 11 Gill & I 28. 33 33 
Am Dec 687 "The principle upon which the declara-
tion or representations of an agent within the scope 
of his authority are permitted to be proved, is (hat 
such declarations as well as his acts are considered 
and treated as the declarations of his principal What 
is so done by an agent is done by the principal 
through him as his mere instrument So whatever is 
said by an agent either in the making a contract for 
his principal or at the time, and accompanying the 
performance of any act within the scope of his 
authority ha\ ing relation to, and connected with and 
in the course of the particular contract or trinsaction 
in which he is then engaged, is in legal effect, said 
by his principal, and idmisstble in evidence not 
niereh because it is (he declaration or admission of 
an agent but on the ground that being made at the 
time of and accompanying the contract or transaction 
it is treated as the declaration or admission of the 
principal, constituting a part of the ' res gestae a 
part of the contract or transaction and as binding 
upon him as if in fact made by himself But declara-
tions or admissions by an agent of his own authority 
and not accompanying the making of a contract, or 
the doing of an act in behalf of his principal nor 
made at the time he is engaged in the transaction to 
which they refer, are not binding upon his principal 
not being part of the "res gestae", and are not admis-
sible in evidence, but come within the general rule of 
law, excluding hearsay evidence being but an ac 
count or statement by an agent of what has passed or 
been done or omitted to be done not a part of the 
transaction but only statements or admissions re 
spectmg it' 
The language from the quotation from the Franklin 
Bank Case, which seems to fit the facts of this case 
is that the so-called admissions of Livingstone appear 
to be the "account or statement by an agent of what 
has passed or been done or omitted to be done,' and 
as agent Livingstone had no such authority to com-
ment or give his idea of what Bridges had formerly 
agreed to do The eighth assignment of error was well 
taken The purported statements of Livingstone al-
leged to have been made on Mav 8 1930 were 
highly prejudicial before a jury and alone would have 
to result in a reversal of this case 
The court gave an instruction which advised the jury 
that the issue was whether on the one hand the con-
tract was as alleged by the plaintiff, or on the other 
hand to scour and sell the wool within 60 days and 
that plaintiff was to reimburse itself for its advances, 
expenses, charges and commissions and not call on 
defendants for any refund We know of no evidence 
substantiating the allegation in the amended answer 
that the defendants *849 were in no event to renn 
burse plaintiff The testimony was that if the wool 
had been sold in 60 days the plaintiff could have re 
imbursed itself for all these charges and there would 
have remained a surplus for defendants But neither 
the written instruments nor any testimony of pur-
ported conversations between Livingstone and Cand-
land reveal any such agreement The testimony of 
Candland that he 'had a conversation with Living-
stone to the effect that the expenses of handling that 
wool was to come out of the difference between what 
I recieved and what it was sold for is not proper evi-
dence to sustain such position In the first place it 
was not admissible under the principles heretofore 
announced to explain the purported ambiguity in the 
writings Secondly, it gives no conversation but con 
elusions They may have been Livingstone's opinion 
as to what could be accomplished by a quick sale and 
not a commitment, Assignment No 6 which attacks 
the admission of this evidence is well taken There 
was testimony that had it been sold such would have 
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;en the effect. The instruction was therefore errone-
JS. Assignment No. 14 is therefore well taken. Also 
isignments Nos. 15 and 16 directed to the same in-
rtiction. Assignments Nos I to 7, both inclusive, 
tack rulinys which we have already discussed. 
he judgment of the lower court is set aside, and a 
ew trial granted; appellant to recover costs 
LIAS HANSEN, C. J., and FOLLAND, EPHKAIM 
[ANSON, and MOFFAT, JJ., concur. 
Jtah 1936. 
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The use of a writing by a witness during an examination for the purpose of refreshing recollection rests largely 
in the discretion of the trial court. 
The use of a writing by a witness during an examination to revive or refresh recollection rests largely in the dis-
cretion of the trial court.[i] Rtdes^law^m^h^rf?!vevralvedtwith^ 
A witness may be compelled to inspect a writing which is present in court where there is reason to believe that.Jjx 
rttiding-u^tnemory-niay-berfefrBshed.tl] Hftweverl>tl»e^K>ur4-.iniist^alerinine-^hetiieiahe-J^ime«.isaesti£yJiig4'rom 
thewrttiiigjQr^rom.recoHeotion;R-^ 
tli&Aviluessihe-lcstimony-that-iB^xpectcd.fi] Mucli depends on the nature of the writing,[6] the circumstances under 
which it was made,[7] and the matter it contains.[8] It may be an error, in a case involving a large number of items 
which a witness is unable to carry in mind or testify to in detail from memory alone, to refuse to permit the witness 
to refer to a writing.[9] 
Any writing which in fact stimulates, revives or refreshes the present memory or recollection of a witness may 
be nscd,[10J including notes;[JJJ niemoranda;[JL2] rccords;[JL3] certificates;[i4] books;[ii] notebooks;[I6] ledg-
ers;[i7] letters;[I8] written bids,[i°J drawings or sketches;[20] maps;[2JJ tax returns;[22] check books;[21] invento-
ries or lists;[24] phone logs;[25] police reports[26] or records;[2_7J accident,[2R] investigative[29] or social welfare 
agency[30] reports; executed legal proccss;[3JJ and a table of life expectancies.[32] The rule also applies to tape 
recordings,[3JJ songs or sound recordings,[34J photographs;[35] and/or scents or alhisions.[3jV) All of the writings 
and documents involved in a business transaction may be used.[T7] Similarly, a summary of a voluminous mass of 
entries contained in numerous books and records may be referred to, provided the original books and documents are 
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in evidence or available for examination by the opposite party.[38] A witness is allowed to read a transcript of prior 
testimony,[J9] a statement the witness made and signed,[40] or an affidavit,];!!] deposition,[42] or wriiien state-
ment.[43J 
The use of a writing is permissible to refresh the memory of a witness as to dates;[44] the witness's physical 
condition at a certain time;fjj_5] the place where the witness was on a certain day;[46] names[47] and addresses;[48] 
physical measurements;[49] and the contents of a lost contract.[50] 
A witness may not testify to facts of which the witness is without present or past recollection and which are 
biought to mind for the first time by the memoranda of another person [51] Thus, a person may not read or testify 
from a transcript of a reporter's notes taken at a former trial where the transcript is not vouched lor by the re-
porter.[52] A witness's testimony of facts to which the witness never had personal knowledge cannot be rendered 
competent by a claim of refreshed recollection.[5Y| Similarly, a witness may not evade a public policy that certain 
reports are privileged and are not admissible in evidence by using such a report to refresh recollection.[54] An entry 
in a record which the witness did not make and of whose correctness the witness did not have peisonal knowledge at 
the time it was made may not be used.[55] 
Laying a foundation for the use of a writing. 
A writing cannot be used to refresh the memory of a witness without a proper foundation being laid [!fi] A wit-
ness should not be allowed to see, consult, or refer to a writing for the purpose of refreshing memory unless and 
until it appears that the aid of this writing is necessary [57] It is proper to refuse to permit the use of writings for this 
purpose where the witness has a clear, distinct, and independent recollection of the facts.[5_8] 
Testimony from revived recollection 
A witness may testify as to matters about which memory has been refreshed[5_9] if the testimony is from a pre-
sent and independent recollection[60] and not from the recollection as recorded,[61] It is no objection that the writ-
ing used is not introduced in evidence,[62] for the refreshment rule does not permit the introduction of the stimulus 
into evidence.[63] The evidence is the testimony of the witness and not the writing used to stimulate this mem-
ory.[<H] The witness must testify to the facts as remembered[65] from the refreshed rccollection,[66] without the aid 
of the writing,[67] and may not read[68] or show[69] the writing to the jury or state what the writing says or 
shows [70] The reliability of the writing need not be established,[7T] nor need the writing be identified,[72J although 
the nature of the writing used is significant in evaluating the probative force of the witness's testimony,[73] 
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 
Cases: 
Neither attorney-client privilege nor work product doctrine barred discovery of documents which deponent used 
to refresh his memory prior to, but not during, the deposition: plaintiff consented to defendants' review of those 
documents at the deposition, answered a number of questions directed at many of those documents without objec-
tion, and the documents would not tread on plaintiffs attorney's thought processes since it was not attorney's sum-
maries which were at issue, but rather, the notations of the deponent himself. Heron Interact. Inc v Guidelines Inc,. 
244 F.R.D 75. 74 Fed R. Fvid Serv 274 (P. Mnss. 2007). 
Victim was entitled to use police report, which contained the contents of text messages defendant sent to victim, 
to refresh her memory regarding the messages, where victim accurately recalled the gist or the general nature of 
each text message prior to viewing the police report. State v. Espiritu. 117 Haw 127. 176 P.3d 8S> (2008). 
If a witness uses a document to refresh his or her recollection on the stand, the spirit and text of the rule govern-
ing a writing or object used to refresh memory require that, absent circumstances addressed by the provision on 
terms and conditions of the production of the document, the parties whose interests could be harmed by the testi-
mony that was based on the refreshed memory must have access to the document Gault \ State. 878 N.E 2d 1260 
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MR. PERKINS: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: I received a -- a phone call about 
illegal parking and other activity in this specific area in the 
city. 
MR. PERKINS: Q. Thank you. Let me, before we go 
into that in further detail. That address that you've given, 
51 South 1600 West, is that within Utah County? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Thank you. 
Will you describe how you responded to the scene and 
what you did? 
A I -- I responded to that particular scene, did not 
locate the vehicle in question. However, I did walk across the 
street at that point to a residence that was initially given to 
me by the individual, stating that maybe the vehicle had been 
parked here in this complex and belonged to the people across 
the street. When I walked across the street, I attempted to 
find that vehicle in question. 
Q What did you observe as you went to that -- well, 
when you say you walked across the street, is that to a 
different address, or is this relatively close to the place you 
responded? 
A It's pretty close. It's right across the street just 
to the south of the original address. It's in a old pharmacy 
parking lot, just right off of West Center Street, about 1500 
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West. And I parked in the old pharmacy parking lot. 
Q Okay. And so you walked across. What did you 
observe when you walked across to this old pharmacy parking 
lot? 
A There's actually a -- a residence, a specific 
residence. It's 1585 West Center Street. There is a separate 
apartment complex. It's almost like a duplex that's just east 
of the old pharmacy parking lot. I parked in that parking lot, 
got out of my vehicle and walked east, rounding the corner of 
the duplex, and at that point I observed a gray vehicle. There 
was one male on the driver's side, one male on the passenger's 
side. 
Q Did you see anybody inside the car? 
A There were actually three occupants of the vehicle, 
including -- there would be technically three and a half. One 
small child was in the vehicle as well. 
Q Were you able to identify those people? 
A I -- I eventually was able to identify all the people 
in the vehicle --
Q Okay. 
A -- and outside of the vehicle. 
Q Okay. Thank you. 
Did you see the defendant there that night? 
A I did see the defendant there. 
Q Where was he? 
A He was on the driver's side of that vehicle. 
Q And did you identify him? 
A Eventually he was identified. 
Q How was that? How did you do that? 
A Some of the people that -- that actually responded 
that night knew him, and he was also identified by name. He 
identified himself, basically eventually told me who he was. 
Q Okay. And what name did he give? 
Tim Lamoreaux. 
And just to make the record clear, you see him here 
I do see him here today. 
Will you please describe him. 
He's the defendant right there in the white shirt and 
MR. PERKINS: Thank you. 
May the record reflect that the witness has 
d the defendant? 
THE COURT: It may, counsel. 
MR. PERKINS: Thank you. 
MR. PERKINS: Q. Who were the occupants of the car? 
A The driver was Suzanne Ruesch. The passenger was 
Amber Coutts. And there was a female that was in the back seat 
who was identified later, but I don't believe her information 
is included in this report. 
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Q Okay. Now, you said Suzanne Ruesch was in the 
driver's seat; is that correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you made mention earlier of three and a half 
people being in the car/ a small child. Where was that child? 
A He was in the back seat with his mom. 
Q Okay. And is that the -- that's the person who 
you've just mentioned you don't have the name for in your 
report? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q How old was that child, based on your -- I mean, 
apparently? 
A If I remember correctly, he was between one to two 
years old. Probably about one and a half. He was toddler I 
want to say. 
Q Okay. All right. Thank you. 
Did you identify who -- ownership of the car? 
A It was Suzanne Ruesch's vehicle. 
Q How did you identify each of the occupants of the 
car? Did they have identification on them? 
A They did have identification. 
Q Okay. Each one of them did? 
A I believe that Suzanne had identification for sure. 
I can't remember Amber, if she had identification or if she 
just told us who she was. And I don't think Mr. Lamoreaux 
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actually had identification on him at that point. 
Q He just identified himself? 
A He did. 
Q Okay. When you came up to the car as you rounded the 
corner, what did you see? 
A I noticed the defendant handing the driver, 
Mrs. Ruesch, something. I wasn't sure exactly what it was at 
that point. 
Q Okay. This is at night, right? 
A It is at night. 
Q Do you remember about what time? 
A I can refer to my report and tell you exactly what 
time. It occurred about 9:52 p.m. 
Q Okay. So is it fair to say it's pretty dark? 
A It was very dark. 
Q How was the area lit? 
A There was a street light, but I did have my 
flashlight with me as well. 
Q And did you use that flashlight? 
A I did use that flashlight. 
Q When you saw Mr. Lamoreaux hand something to Suzanne 
Ruesch, did you have your flashlight on then? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. What did you do next? 
A At that point, being very concerned, I had the two 
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gentlemen step around to the rear of the vehicle where I could I 
kind of keep an eye on 'em just to -- for -- for my safety. 1 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
you do? 
A 
Uh-huh. 
And that's kind of what we did at that point. I 
Okay. At any point did you arrest Mr. Lamoreaux? 1 
I did eventually arrest Mr. Lamoreaux. 1 
Okay. After you had arrested Mr. Lamoreaux, what did 
At that point I continued to interview the 
individuals who were still at the scene, attempting to get more j 
and addit ional information, which was done. Eventually he was J 
transported to the Utah County Jail along with the others 
involved. 
Q 
the peopl 
location. 
A 
Q 
suspect a 
Okay. Before we go into that, let me ask you about 
e that you interviewed while you were still at that 1 
Did you talk to Suzanne Ruesch? 1 
I did. 
Okay. Did she say anything that gave you cause to 
crime? 
MR. KING: Objection, Your Honor. Hearsay. 
THE COURT: It's not hearsay. He can just say yes or 
no. He's not going to testify as to what she said. 
MR. KING: So long as the witness understands that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Very well. 
MR. PERKINS: Your Honor, the State would respond. 
My follow up question is going to be about --
THE COURT: Well, then let's wait for that and wait 
for the objection. So I'll wait for the --he can respond to 
this question first of all. 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: Can you repeat the question one more 
time? 
MR. PERKINS: Q. Did you interview, or did 
Ms. Ruesch say anything to you that caused you to suspect the 
commission of any crime? 
A Yes. 
Q What was that? 
MR. KING: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PERKINS: At this point, Your Honor, the State 
would contend that we're not submitting this for the truth of 
the matter, but only to establish the reason for Officer 
Sorensen's search of the car. 
THE COURT: Okay. The defense can respond. 
MR. KING: Your Honor, may we approach? 
THE COURT: Surely. 
(Side-bar held at the Bench off the record.) 
THE COURT: I need to make a record, counsel. 
I will reject the objection, deny the objection, and 
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find that it's not being presented for the purposes of the 
establishment of truth It's not relied upon as it relates to 
the truth of the assertion involved And he may respond then, 
to the question 
Why don't you repeat that question counsel 
MR PERKINS I will with some clarification 
MR PERKINS Q Officer Sorensen, m response to 
this question, I'm not asking for each detail and the 
conversation that you had with Ms Ruesch, I'm just asking you 
about what did you cause to search her car 
So the question is what did Ms Ruesch state to you 
m your interview with her that caused you to suspect a crime' 
A She admitted that there was methamphetamine in her 
vehicle, and that it was placed there initially, she stated by 
the defendant 
Q Thank you 
Did you perform a search of her car after that"7 
A I did 
Q And what did you find m her car' 
A There was a black bag which was located behind the 
passenger's seat of her vehicle on the floorboard In that 
black bag it contained a lot of small baggies which are used to 
contain or -- methamphetamme generally There was a large 
amount of methamphetamme which was in a cigarette container, 
which was also m that black bag, and other items of 
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paraphernalia, like baggies and things like that 
Q I've got several follow up questions 
The methamphetamme that you found you said there 
was a large amount Did you determine how much that was' 
A It was eventually weighed and determined to be about 
17 grams of methamphetamme 
Q In your training and experience, what does that 
amount indicate to you' 
A That is a very large amount of methamphetamme, 
definitely not for personal use That would be a 
distributing --an amount that would be distributed, not just 
kept for personal use 
Q Okay Now, you mentioned plastic baggies m a 
cigarette container When you found the meth, was it in any 
baggies or was it loose mside that cigarette container? 
A It was in the baggies inside the cigarette container 
Q And did you find it all in one bag or how was it 
packaged' 
A It was packaged all m one bag 
Q And you mentioned other plastic baggies in that black 
leather pouch as well' 
A Yes, sir 
Q In your training and experience, what are those 
generally used for' 
A To contain methamphetamme in order to distribute it 
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Q And how does that work' If you'll just describe, you 
know, your experience with dealing with drug crimes When you 
find a large quantity of methamphetammes m several small 
baggies, how do you put two and two together' If you would put 
two and two together for us' 
A Usually the -- the -- the amount of methamphetamine 
that was found m the vehicle was pre-packaged Sometimes 
you'll find it m a -- m a bigger baggy Usually you know for 
sure that it was packaged for distribution what's in the 
smaller baggies A lot of times what will happen is when 
somebody distributee this -- this amount of drugs, they'll 
actually take what they've got originally, put it in the small 
bags, they'll measure it, they'll weigh it, make sure they've 
got the right amounts, and then they'll determine an amount of 
money as far as the cost based on the weight and the -- the 
amount that are found in these baggies And there were a lot 
of baggies 
Q Okay Thank you 
You said it was meth What indicated to you, what 
made you think it was methamphetamme' 
A It looks like meth It has the same color 
consistency as meth And it was eventually field tested and 
tested positive for methamphetamme 
Q Now when you say it looked like meth will you 
Aacn-vi H o t-V>» c;ii'hcjt-anr,e>"? 
A White crystalli substance, small chunks It was --
this was actually some pretty good stuff It was more white 
than is normal Usually it's kind of a yellow color That all 
depends on how it's manufactured This was pretty good stuff 
Q When you say pretty good stuff, what do you mean' 
A It was -- you know, there wasn't a lot that was put 
in it that was used to -- to cut it It definitely looked more 
pure than is -- than what I've seen 
Q Okay And, again, for those of us with less 
experience with meth, what do you mean by cut it' 
A They put a bunch of different agents, chemicals, 
other substances in it, m order to actually make it or 
manufacture it And it just all depends on the process as far 
as the color, consistency, all that stuff 
Q So are you saying the fact that it was more white 
indicates that it was more pure' 
A I -- I think so 
MR PERKINS Okay 
At this point, Your Honor, I'd like to move to 
present --or excuse me, I'd like to present Exhibits 1 and 2 
to Officer Sorensen 
THE COURT Have they previously been marked' 
MR PERKINS They have not 
THE COURT Have them marked by the clerk of the 
court, please 
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MR PERKINS Two actually contains Beveral items 
Actually, I think we better just leave that one in the bag 
THE CLERK All right 
THE COURT Show them to counsel, please 
you may approach 
MR PERKINS Thank you 
MR PERKINS Q Officer Sorensen, will you describe 
the package that I've handed to you marked State's Exhibit 1' 
A Yes, sir This is the actual -- the packaging that 
was sent to the State lab, which contains the 17 grams of 
methamphetamine 
Q Okay I'd like to invite you to open the package and 
pull out a sample of that 
THE COURT Dc you need the benefit of some scissors'? 
THE WITNESS Yes, I do 
THE COURT Here you go 
MR PERKINS And if it please the Court, may I have 
the permission to have the -- excuse me -- the witness approach 
the jury to show the methamphetamine without having to --
THE COURT Well, you can publish to the jury 
certainly, but you will probably approach --
MR PERKINS Okay 
THE COURT -- the jury, as opposed to the witnfess, 
please 
MR PERKINS Okay 
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MR PERKINS Q Officer Sorensen, now that you've 
opened that package, will you describe the contents'? 
A These are the baggies of methamphetamine that were 
located m the vehicle belonging to Suzanne Ruesch 
Q And how many baggies are you holding in your hand"? 
A There's actually three baggies 
Q Okay And each one of them contains methamphetamine'? 
A Yes, it does 
MR PERKINS Your Honor, the State moves to admit 
Exhibit 1 
THE COURT Any objection, counsel'' 
MR KING No, Your Honor 
THE COURT It may be received State's 
Exhibit No 1 
(State's Exhibit No 1 was received into evidence ) 
MR PERKINS And the State requests permission to 
publish it to the jury 
THE COURT You may 
MR PERKINS Thank you 
THE COURT And then, Mr Stevens, when they finally 
reach you, if you will just place those there on the end of the 
jury box 
MR PERKINS Q Was any of that meth found in any 
other locations besides that cigarette box"? 
A No, sir 
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Q Okay If you'll move now to the package I've handed 
you marked Exhibit 2 Will you describe the contents of jphat 
package"? 
A Yes, sir In one of the bags are the small baggies 
which are usually there to -- m order to contain the 
methamphetamine for distribution Also, in one of the bags is 
the cigarette package that the methamphetamine was contained 
in There's also digital scales and the black bag which 
contained all of the items which are contained not only here 
but also are just next to the jury box 
Q Okay And what you've described are the contents of 
the black leather pouch that you testified to finding earlier"? 
A Yes, sir 
MR PERKINS Thank you 
The State moves to admit Exhibit 2 
THE COURT Any objection, counsel? 
MR KING No, Your Honor 
THE COURT State's Exhibit No 2 may be received 
(State's Exhibit No 2 was received into evidence ) 
MR PERKINS And, again, the State requests 
permission to publish it to the jury 
THE COURT You may 
MR PERKINS Thank you 
THE COURT Ladies and gentlemen, as this is shown to 
vm: qimnlv don't onen he baa at all as vou nass that around 
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Thank you 
MR PERKINS Q Now, taking all of what you have 
testified to which you saw into account, what did you suspect 
was happening"? 
A That they were distributing methamphetamine 
Q When you say "they, " who do you mean"? How did you 
think this was working"? 
A I -- I actually thought that the defendant initially 
was the one that was actually doing the distribution 
Q Okay And what was that based on"? 
What I initially observed as I walked up to the A 
vehicle 
Q 
A 
That being"? 
The -- that he was there next to the vehicle, that he 
had handed something to the driver 
Q Okay After you found all of this stuff m 
Ms Ruesch's car, did you talk to her again"? 
A I did 
Q Okay We're going to hear from her later, so I won't 
have you discuss at this point what she said to you 
Did you interview Mr Lamoreaux at any point"? 
A I did 
Q And when was that"? 
A I actually talked to him several times throughout the 
ah t-hp qcpnp ai well as at the nail 
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Q 
the scene 
A 
what was 
situation 
Q 
after he 
A 
know, his 
mentioned 
Q 
you asked 
A 
Q 
A 
He didn't 
actually 
Okay Let's talk about your discussion with him at j 
What did you ask him' j 
After he was mirandized, I -- I basically asked him j 
going on, if he could kind of fill me in on the 1 
and circumstances 1 
Let me have you pause for a moment When you said 
was mirandized, what do you mean by that' 1 
He was given his Miranda warnings indicating, you 1 
right to remain silent and that anything that he I 
to me could be used against him m court j 
Okay So after you advised him of those warnings, 
him what was going on' 1 
Yes, sir 
Okay And will you describe that discussion' 
He at that point basically denied any involvement 
know what was going on, had no knowledge that it was 
methamphetamme in the vehicle Basically m my j 
opinion played completely innocent of anything 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Okay Did you make any other arrests that night' 
I did 
Who did you arrest? 
Suzanne Ruesch was arrested and also Amber Coutts 
Who was the passenger' 
Yes, sir 
Okay Were any of these people taken to the Utah 
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County Jail' 
A They were all taken to the Utah County Jail 
Q And did you speak with them again at the jail' 
A I did I spoke with all three 
Q Okay Let's talk about your discussion with 
Mr Lamoreaux while you were at the jail Where were you when 
you had that discussion' 
A I was at the booking desk, which is if you go into 
the jail, you go into the sally port, you go in the front door 
there's several computers there where -- that we use in order 
to put the information m on each individual that's brought 
into the jail He was actually sitting right next to me at the 
time I was at the computer He wasn't more than three, 
four -- three feet at the most from where I was next to the 
computer 
Q Okay And what did you say to him' 
A At that point I was talking to him just like a friend 
or friends would talk to each other, having a conversation 
about the situation and circumstances I tried to tell him 
based on the information that I had gained from the people that 
he was involved with, that he was m a lot of trouble, and, you 
know, it was basically --it was better for him to be honest 
and let me know what was going on And he initially denied, 
again, that he was involved in any kind of distribution issue 
at the scene, b^ tJgj£efitualJ-V--he_did make some incriminating 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
statements 
Q Now, let me ask you real quick Did you take any 
written statements from any of the people while you were at the 
scene' 
A I did 
Q And who was that from' 
A Ms Ruesch specifically 
Q Did you inform Mr Lamoreaux that you had a written 
statement' 
A I did He was actually right there when she was 
actually writing it out 
Q Okay So when you were discussing this with him at 
the jail, he knew there was this statement? 
A Yeah, he saw her writing it out 
Q Okay You mentioned after you advised him that it 
might be better for him to be honest and cooperate that__he made 
some admissions Will you describe what he said? 
A I will Initially, he would --he kept asking me, 
Why am I here, why am I here? I -- I didn't do anything You 
know, I wasn't involved m any of this 
And then I would -- I told him, Tim, you know, I've 
got all this information You know, just come clean and tell 
me -- tell me what's going on, you know 
And at that point, \a£cording to my reportt I 
•.r^-i,-at-ori hprp -- if I can refer to that' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Q You can refer to it to refresh your memory, but 
please don't read from it 
A Okay He did admit that he was involved in making 
the arrangements to distribute methamphetamme. 
Q And did he use those words' 
A He probably did not use those specific words 
Q Do you recall roughly what he said' 
A To -- to be honest, to the best of my recollection, 
I -- I can't recall his specific words, exactly what he said 
Q How did he indicate to you that he had been involved' 
A He -- he eventually saidfxeah, you know, I -- you're 
right^} 
Q Okay And did he say anything else? 
A You know, to be honest, I can't remember exactly what 
he said (after that J> 
Q Okay So did he say anything about making phone 
calls to Suzanne Ruesch' 
A Yes 
Q What did he state' 
A He indicated to me initially that he was on his cell 
phone and that he had contacted Suzanne Ruesch 
Q Did he state what the purpose of contacting her was' 
A To be honest, and it's not in my -- as far as I can 
see in my report If I can refer to it real quick' 
Q That's fine 
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A I don't see that I included in my report exactly what 
he mentioned in the phone call --or conversation. 
Q Okay. That's fine. 
Did he say anything about what you saw when you 
walked up? "?ou said you saw b.im handing something to somebody. 
Did he say anything about that? 
A He did. He indicated that it wasn't what I thought 
it was, that he was actually only handing her a cell phone. 
Q Did he say why he was handing her a cell phone? 
Or let me back up. Did he say whose cell phone it 
was? 
A I can't remember if he -- if he said that it was 
actually his cell phone or whose cell phone it was. But he had 
it in his possession, and I -- I do believe that it was his 
cell phone. 
Q Okay. And did he say anything about what the 
conversation was about that he was having on the phone as he 
handed it to Ms. Ruesch? 
A If I remember right, I don't know that he actually 
told me what the conversation was initially that --as far as 
the cell phone. 
Q Okay. What about what he said indicated to you that 
he had been involved with this drug deal? 
A Let me refer to my report one more time, please. 
Q That's fine. 
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A Can I refer to my report and read that specifically? 
THE COURT: Well, it depends on whether or not 
there's an objection. Because he can utilize it for the 
purpose of refreshing his memory. 
MR. KING: Your Honor, I think the witness has 
testified that he doesn't have a memory of what was actually 
said. If he read from the report, he would simply be reading 
from the report, which would be hearsay. 
He's read the report. He's testified that he can't 
remember what was said. I would say that it's been shown that 
the report is not able to refresh his memory. Therefore, it 
would be inadmissible. 
THE COURT: I don't know. The next question is 
whether or not reading the report -- whether it does, in fact, 
refresh his memory. If it does, then he can make reference to 
it. If it doesn't, then he has no independent recollection as 
it relates to it and the objection would be sustained. 
MR. PERKINS: Okay. 
MR. PERKINS: Q. Does that report refresh your 
memory about what Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that night? 
A (Tobehonest, no, it doesn' t^> 
Q Okay. Did Mr. Lamoreaux say anything about why he 
changed his stories, from initially denying any involvement and 
then admitting to you that he was involved? 
A Not that I recall. 
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